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Abstract. Web-based authentication is a popular mechanism implemented by
Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISPs) because it allows a simple registra-
tion and authentication of customers, while avoiding the high resource require-
ments of the new IEEE 802.11i security standard and the backward compatibility
issues of legacy devices. In this work we demonstrate two different and novel at-
tacks against web-based authentication. One attack exploits operational anoma-
lies of low- and middle-priced devices in order to hijack wireless clients, while
the other exploits an already known vulnerability within wired-networks, which
in dynamic wireless environments turns out to be even harder to detect and protect
against.
Keywords:
WLAN, Security, Authentication, Attacks
1 Introduction
Taking into consideration the tremendous growth of public Internet access, one can eas-
ily see that IEEE 802.11 [1] networks have played a major role during recent years. High
transmission rates, low costs, and simple deployment have all resulted in a high num-
ber of hotspots that are now offering wireless Internet access in coffee shops, airports,
libraries, conferences, hotels, etc. For example, one of the major German WISP states
that it operates more than 25,000 domestic and international hotspots that customers
may use in order to roam and access the Internet worldwide.
Parallel to the popularity of wireless LAN technology, the topic of its security
gained a similar, although rather negative publicity. The tragic end of Wired Equiv-
alent Privacy (WEP) [9,4] and the simplicity of various DoS attacks on the wireless
medium have resulted in giving up the security at the logical-link layer and shifting it
to upper layers (or in the best case leaving it within virtual private networks (VPNs)).
Although WLAN’s new security standard IEEE 802.11i [2], which was ratified
in 2004, provides mechanisms for strong mutual authentication, data integrity, and
data confidentiality, its deployment and utilization have not followed the same growth.
Therefore, IEEE 802.11i is still not widely utilized, its strong security services often re-
quire new hardware and the extension of the already existing infrastructure, and most of
the handhelds have not yet been certified according to the standard. As a result, WISPs
incorporate proprietary security solutions that can easily be implemented within their
infrastructure and business models, providing a higher usability and lower complexity
for customers, but on the other hand customers are expected to take care of security
themselves.
In a popular scenario of public hotspots provided by WISPs most security services
are reduced to a simple access control mechanism which is implemented through a
web-based authentication. For example, in most of the WISPs that we have analyzed,
the only requirement placed upon a customer is to have a “wireless-enabled mobile de-
vice, BSSID set to a WISP, and Internet-ready web browser”. No additional software is
required. Every user can associate himself with a WISP’s access point and by launch-
ing his Internet-browser he will be redirected to a login page. A customer can use that
page to either authenticate or create a new account by paying for wireless access with
his credit card. Upon a successful login, his Ethernet address (MAC address) will be
authenticated and allowed to access Internet. This simple solution does not require any
knowledge of digital certificates, signatures, or any other security mechanisms. Yet, as
we will show in this work, there is a price to pay for this simplicity.
We show and analyze two different attacks on web-based authentication. The goal
of both attacks is to impersonate a legal AP and to inject a fake web page asking the
user for his credentials. The first attack targets the access points and can in certain cases
result in operational anomalies allowing the attacker to “steal” new clients. This attack
is described and discussed in Section 2. The second attack focuses on the wireless
clients and is based on a well-known vulnerability within wired networks. Unlike in
wired networks, however, it shows to be still fully exploitable today and fatal on every
wireless client, especially in conjunction with web-based authentication. The second
attack as well as various countermeasures are discussed in Section 3. The related work
on this subject is presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes this work.
2 Flooding-based Client Hijacking
By executing a DoS attack, the aim of the attacker is to exhaust the server’s resources
which would then result in the server’s inability to provide any service at all. On one
hand, this can remain the main goal of the attacker or on the other hand, it can serve as
a starting point for the execution of even more sophisticated attacks. A similar attack
can also be started against web-based authentication provided that the attacker is able to
disrupt an original service offered by a WISP’s AP and during the attack a fake service
is provided to wireless users. IEEE 802.11 networks have been subject to this type of
attack from the beginning of their deployment. Back in 2001/2002 various tools were
enabling a DoS attack based on flooding an AP with authentication requests. Today,
most access points should no longer be vulnerable to this type of attack since most
of them offer a simple yet effective protection based on periodically allowing only a
certain amount of new requests.
2.1 IEEE 802.11 Association Process
Before going into more detail, we briefly summarize the functionality of IEEE 802.11
networks operating in infrastructure mode.
The infrastructure mode of IEEE 802.11 contains an access point which provides
certain control and management functionalities. An access point takes care of accepting
only the data traffic of wireless stations that are in a valid connection state. A wireless
station can be in three different connection states: initial state, “authenticated but not
associated” state, and “authenticated and associated” state. In order to send or receive
data frames, the wireless client must be in the third state, i.e. in the “authenticated and
associated” state.
A successful authentication is realized by sending an authentication frame in which
one of two different authentication algorithms can be chosen: Open-System authenti-
cation (meaning no authentication at all) or Shared-Key authentication. Since the in-
troduction of IEEE 802.11i and as a consequence of WEP being completely broken,
Open-System authentication is now the only mandatory IEEE 802.11 authentication al-
gorithm. Therefore, an authentication frame can no longer provide any authentication
functionality but serves mainly to bring the wireless station into the second state. Af-
ter a successful authentication, the wireless station proceeds by sending an association
frame by which the association procedure is being finalized. From that moment onward,
a wireless client is able to receive and send data.
On the other side, if an AP detects frames coming from a wireless client that is not
in a valid state (with respect to the frames it is sending), the AP will respond with either
a deauthentication frame or a disassociation frame, depending on the state the client
managed to reach. This mechanism is important for two reasons; the first is to help a
wireless station to re-authenticate itself in case it is in the wrong state and the second
is to mitigate the possibility of an AP impersonation. For example, if a fake AP uses
the same MAC address of a legal AP to steal wireless clients, the legal AP will then
respond with a deauthentication frame to every client that starts to communicate with
the fake AP.
2.2 Exploiting Operational Vulnerability
Although no real authentication takes place during the association process, an AP still
needs to reserve resources to keep state about every wireless client. Common DoS at-
tacks make use of this fact to fill up authentication table by flooding the AP with fake
authentication requests. Eventually, this results in a total crash of the AP after which
only a physical reset could help [8]. An attacker may then use its own fake AP to im-
personate a legal one. One should assume that this kind of DoS attack should not be
feasible anymore on modern equipment. With the aim of investigating this matter we
have collected 6 different access points dating from 2003 to 2006 that were chosen
based on their popularity and price (all of them with the latest firmware upgrade as pro-
vided by the manufacturer). For legal purposes, we keep the vendor and product names
of the selected APs anonymous and therefore only describe price classes:
– Class 1: low-priced access points (≤50 USD). Two APs, produced in 2003, 2004.
– Class 2: middle-priced access points (from 50 USD to 100 USD). Two APs, pro-
duced in 2004, 2006.
– Class 3: high-priced access-points (from 350 USD and higher). Two APs, produced
in 2004, 2006.
To analyze the AP’s behaviour we have flooded each AP with approximately 50 au-
thentication requests per second. Since no significant differences in the operation of
APs within the same class were detected, we select one AP from each class to describe
it in more detail.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280
Sec
N
r.
Class 3
Class 2
Class 1
Fig. 1. Time trace of successful authentications
Figure 1 shows the behaviour of one representative of each class under the flooding
attack. As it can be seen, the most expensive AP (Class 3) allows 63 new authentication
requests every 60 seconds. It is interesting to mention that both APs of Class 3, after al-
lowing a certain number of requests, refuse to send any further reponse. This violates the
IEEE 802.11 standard which mandates replies with appropriate reason codes to notify
wireless client of unsuccessful authentications. This minor deviation from the standard
introduces a certain performance degradation for wireless clients, because clients wait
for the maximal response timeout before trying to authenticate again (we have observed
that certain clients wait up to 7 seconds before retrying to authenticate).
In contrast to Class 3, both other classes accept various numbers of requests approx-
imately every 2 minutes. Furthermore, they notify wireless clients if the authentication
request has not been accepted by sending an “unsuccessful authentication” response.
On the other hand, both classes have a high decrease in the number of accepted re-
quests after initial admission, thus it seems that the flooding attack still impacts their
resource management. Especially interesting is the longer period of time at which both
other classes accept authentication request (e.g. one of the Class 2 APs accepts 126 au-
thentication requests within the first 12 seconds and one of the Class 1 APs accepts 95
new requests within the first 30 seconds).
To analyze these phenomena in more detail, we have measured the delay between
authentication requests and responses before and during the flooding attack. The attack
rate remains the same with approximately 50 authentication requests per second, which
implies an attacker throughput of about 1.5 KByte/s. The flooding attack started after
20 seconds of normal operation. We have found that both Class 1 and Class 2 APs
suffer from an operational anomaly that causes an exceptionally high delay between
the authentication request and the authentication response (see Figure 2). After only 8
seconds of flooding, the response delay increases to 12 seconds. This is in contrast to
all Class 3 APs where the authentication response delay remains stable with a mean of
1.6 ms and a standard deviation of 3 ms.
From a security perspective all three classes of APs have a potential vulnerability.
Class 3 APs only respond to accepted authentication requests, leaving all other wireless
clients waiting for authentication responses for a client-dependent period of time. This
fact can be exploited by an attacker who uses a fake AP with the same MAC address
to answer authentication and association requests as successful. As a result, wireless
clients associate with the fake AP instead of the legal one.
The two other classes, although answering all requests, suffer from a high delay
during the flooding attack by which only after 12 seconds an authentication response
reaches a wireless client. Similary, the attacker can also answer those requests before
the legal AP.
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Fig. 2. Authentication and Deauthentication Delay
One last barrier for the attacker is the Deauthentication frame which is sent every
time a data frame from an unauthenticated client is detected by the AP (as explained in
subsection 2.1). We have measured the delay for this frame under the same experimen-
tal settings and only Class 3 APs are able to send the Deauthentication frame on time,
meaning without any significant delay (mean response time for Deauthentication frame
is 1.04 ms with a std.dev. of 1.7 ms). Both other classes have an increased Deauthen-
tication delay which follows the Authentication delay as depicted in Figure 2. These
results show that Class 3 APs, although deviating from the IEEE 802.11 standard, do
not appear to have a security vulnerability due to their prompt response with a Deau-
thentication frame in a case of their impersonation. This, regrettably cannot be said for
their cheaper relatives.
2.3 Attack Implementation
In this subsection we are particularly interested in exploiting the aforementioned anoma-
lies in order to implement an AP impersonation attack. The scenario remains the same
as described in the motivation. The attacker’s objective is to impersonate a WISP’s ac-
cess point and to inject a fake web page to a wireless client.
Discovered delays of Class 1 and Class 2 APs enable us to fully disguise the fake
AP as a legal one. In the following steps we describe our implementation:
1. An attacker consists of a laptop running a web server and two wireless interfaces.
One of the interfaces is set to a master mode in order to enable the access point’s
functionality (called a fake AP) while another one is used to start the flooding
attack. The web server responds to all HTTP requests sent by a user and contains
the same web page as the one of the WISP.
2. The MAC address of the fake AP is set to correspond to the MAC address of the
legal AP using the same BSSID. The attacker starts flooding the legal AP.
3. After the legal AP has increased its authentication and deauthentication delay, the
fake AP starts answering every request sent by wireless clients.
4. The attacker captures HTTP requests and responds with a fake web page (it can
also choose to respond to any other control packet like ARP, DNS, DHCP,...).
As a result of this attack, we were able to authenticate and associate every wireless
client with the fake AP. As assumed, all Class 1,2 APs did not detect the impersonation
and the wireless clients successfully established a connection with a fake AP before the
first Deauthentication frames from a legal AP arrived and deauthenticated the client. In
order to analyse the quality of the connection between a wireless client and the fake
AP, we have measured both UDP and TCP throughputs (shown in Figure 3). The UDP
sender rate was set to 5 Mb/sec.
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Fig. 3. UDP (left) and TCP (right) throughput
Figure 3 shows that during the first 22 seconds the communication between the fake
AP and the wireless client is undisturbed by the legal AP. We were able to intercept all
requests and successfully redirect the wireless client to the fake web page without notic-
ing any quality loss or other indication of the attack. Following that, the channel was
influenced by Deauthentications frames sent from a legal AP. By receiving a Deauthen-
tication frame, the wireless client would disconnect and immediately try to reconnect.
Again, the fake AP was the first to react and the connection was re-established. This
can be clearly seen in the UDP traffic where the connection is disrupted by slots where
the client is not connected. Although this frequent re-connection disturbs the link-layer
connection, the transport layer still provides a connection. The TCP throughput on the
right shows a trace of SSL traffic between the wireless client and the fake web-server
which was used to present a fake authentication login page similar to those from WISPs.
Another interesting question that occurs is why the delay presented in figure 3 is
higher then the one initially measured between authentication request and response (12
UDP Throughput [Mbit/s] 1 2 3 5
delay (mean) [s] 13.23 14.40 20.17 32.97
std. dev. 1.75 1.96 7.07 12.20
Table 1. Various UDP rates and measured delay
seconds). The reason is that the delay strongly depends on the traffic sent to the AP. In
table 1, we have used different UDP sender rates and 15 repetitions for each level of
UDP throughput. It turned out that increased traffic highly increses AP’s response delay
and delay variance.
2.4 Discussion
In this attack we have shown how simple it is for an attacker to fully impersonate a
legal AP. It also shows that web-based authentication is highly vulnerable, meaning
that the users but also providers should be more careful in using and providing such
an authentication method. This attack was possible on all low-priced and middle-priced
access points. Only the most expensive class of access points was immune to this kind
of attack. In our opinion, this is an important fact because often the low price of IEEE
802.11 technology is considered to be one of its most mentioned advantages.
Another question that arises is how realistic this attack can be? On one hand, an
attacker is able to spoof a web page, but on the other hand he still cannot fake an
original WISP’s digital certificate. This is a well known issue and although most of
today’s attacks, from fake emails to phishing web-sites, are technically solved, it is also
well-known that the most effective and successfull attacks are the one based on abusing
human naivity [15].
3 Wireless ARP Attack
In contrast to the attack described in the previous section which is based on attacking
APs, in this section we describe an attack which focuses directly on wireless clients. It is
based on the well-known idea of ARP spoofing, which although considered to be solved
within wired networks, can be fully exploited within wireless networks. We show that
by tweaking certain IEEE 802.11 frame parameters, a novel wireless ARP spoofing
attack can be mounted which is hard to detect. Moreover, even a well-administrated
infrastucture with ARP spoofing protection based on packet analysis cannot help in
securing the wireless part of the network. As a result, the simplest solution against
this attack is to abandon web-based authentication and to use the logical-link layer
protection provided, e.g., by the IEEE 802.11i security standard.
3.1 Good Old ARP Poisoning
The Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is used to resolve an IP address to a 48 bit
Ethernet address (MAC address) [RFC826]. It is a simple protocol consisting of the
sender’s IP address and sender’s MAC address as well as the target’s IP address (which
is known to the sender) and MAC address (which is unknown). Since the ARP request is
being sent as broadcast, it will therefore be received by every host on the same network.
The host with the target IP address will then respond with an ARP reply containing his
Ethernet address as a target MAC address.
By replying to ARP requests with an ARP replay containing a fake target MAC
address, an attacker can simply redirect clients traffic to itself. This is why the ARP
protocol has served as the basis for many different Man-In-The-Middle and DoS attacks
mostly focused on switched (wired) networks.
The simplicity and frequency of ARP spoofing attacks in wired networks has re-
sulted in a wide-spectrum of solutions that can detect and avoid the problem of fake
ARP replies (existing solutions against ARP spoofing will be discussed later on in sub-
section 3.3). Nevertheless, in contrast to a wired infrastructure, wireless enviroments
are considerably different in their nature. Most importantly, public hotspots are charac-
terized by clients which dynamically join and leave the wireless network.
In this section, we analyze an ARP spoofing attack within wireless networks. We
assume an attacker model in which the objective is to undetectably execute an ARP
spoofing attack and to impersonate the legal AP or a web server used to authenticate a
user.
3.2 Attack Implementation
At first sight, in order for the attacker to mount an ARP spoofing attack, he can sim-
ply choose to impersonate either the already associated stations or the AP itself by
using their MAC addresses as sender address. Although still effective, both of these
approaches can be successfully detected. For every frame that the attacker sends (using
either the address of an associated client or of the AP) the receiving station will send
an acknowledgment. As a result, by receiving many acknowledgment frames, the legal
station can identify that someone is using the same MAC address to send frames. An-
other problem that arises from impersonation of an already existing wireless client is
that any frame received by the AP can be forwarded to a wired network in which traffic
monitoring tools or intrusion detection systems can easily detect this kind of attack.
Therefore, to avoid being monitored and analyzed by more sophisticated systems,
an attacker prefers to attack only wireless clients. Hence his goal is to keep fake ARP
packets only within the wireless network. Furthermore, in order to avoid being detected
by acknowledgements sent to existing clients, the attacker requires the possibility of
using unknown MAC addresses as the source address for his attack.
In the following section we show that only by tweaking certain 802.11 frame charac-
teristics an attacker can successfully send fake ARP packets with fully unknown MAC
addresses, keep them undetectable by the AP and thus limit their propagation to wireless
participants only.
Figure 4 shows a generic frame control field which is a part of every 802.11 frame.
The two one-bit flags ToDS and FromDS are used to indicate whether the frame
is sent from the distribution system to a wireless station or the other way around. In
infrastructure mode, any frame sent from a wireless client will have the ToDS bit set
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Fig. 4. 802.11 Frame Control Field
and FromDS bit cleared. Those frames are checked by AP to assure that a sender is an
authenticated and associated station (as described in subsection 2.1).
On the other side, if the frame has the FromDS bit set, the AP believes that the
frame was sent from a different AP (one distribution system can contain several APs).
The AP does not know all the stations within the distribution system and cannot check
if the sender’s MAC belongs to a known and associated station. As a result, by setting
FromDS bit an attacker can send arbitrary frames, even with an unknown MAC address
without the frame being intercepted by the AP. These fake frames will therefore not be
forwarded to the distribution system which renders protection mechanisms inside the
networks.
The very last problem that the attacker hast to overcome in order to successfully
disguse his attack is the fact that although pretending to come from a wired network,
the replies are recieved by an AP over the wireless medium. Although this could be
used by AP to detect a fake frame, the mentioned situation is valid within IEEE 802.11
networks in case of a wireless bridge (valid ToDS and FromDS configurations and their
meaning is shown in Table 2). Thus, AP will neither see it as security vulnerability nor
will it react to it.
ToDS = 0 ToDS = 1
FromDS = 0 IBSS (ad hoc mode) Frames from stations
to DS
FromDS = 1 Frames exiting the DS Frames from AP to AP
(wireless bridge)
Table 2. ToDS and FromDS Flags and Their Meaning
As a proof of concept we have created smartspoof tool which implements and ex-
ecutes the attack described above (the tool can be made available upon request). It is
an event-based tool that monitors the wireless medium for ARP requests and then im-
mediately answers with a fake ARP inside a manipulated IEEE 802.11 frame. From
our experiments in which we have used various wireless clients (both Linux-based and
Windows-based) we can state that this attack was successfully executed on every tested
client and after only a few minutes, all wireless clients had a poisoned ARP cache and
the traffic was diverted to the attacker.
3.3 Discussion
Among the most common protections against ARP spoofing is a static ARP where the
MAC-to-IP mapping can only be changed manually. Although very efficient within
small infrastructures, this solution is not suitable for more dynamic environments. Es-
pecially in wireless environments where joining clients are new and initially do not
know the network configuration, this solution cannot be implemented without intro-
ducing additional complexity. Furthermore, we have seen that different monitoring and
traffic analyzing tools that are used inside the wired network to check if ARP replies
provide valid MAC addresses are not effective. These mechanisms focus on networks
in which traffic can be physically controlled. In contrast, a wireless environment with
its broadcast nature makes neither of these solutions practical.
A more successful approach would be to monitor and analyze the wireless traffic.
The difficulty in this approach lies in the operating mode of an access point. To be able
to capture all traffic and still provide management and control functions, an AP must
operate simultaneously in both, monitoring mode and master mode. However, that is
still imposes certain operational problems because in this case all the traffic should be
analyzed by the AP itself. A more simple protection based on this approach would be
to have additional access points for monitoring the traffic which consequently increases
operational costs.
Another protection against ARP poisoning used in wired networks are client-based
ARP monitoring tools (e.g. XArp [14]) that can detect and avoid any changes made to
ARP cache. This solution suffers from the same disadvantage as any monitoring tool
in environmetns where the correct IP-to-MAC mapping is not known at the beginning.
The client cannot distinguish which one of different ARP replies is fake although the
tool itself can help a user to detect the existence of different ARP replies.
One of the most successful solutions would be to use the IEEE 802.11i security
standard with its cryptography-based protection which provides authentication of every
data frame. This solution is definitely effective and easily implemented in case of a wire-
less enterprise network. However, in contrast to a wireless enterprise network where all
clients are known in advance and where the network is centrally administrated, the im-
plementation of 802.11i within public, easily accessible wireless networks seems still to
present a problem (although according to our measurements the performance tradeoff
of introducting IEEE 802.11i does not represent a significant performance decline [12]).
As a matter of fact, the usability-related problems of enforcing such security policies
within public WLAN hotspots have already resulted in abandoning PKI-based solutions
in favor of more light-weight propriatery solutions like web-based authentication which
are the aim of the attacks as motivated at the beginning of this work.
4 Related Work
In 2003 the WLAN’s security was a centar of various attacks agains all security ob-
jectives. The unprotected management and control frames allowed fast and effective
attacks on availability [3]. The poor security of WEP allowed attacks on confidentiality
and integrity [5,9,4]. Tools like e.g. void11 [8], file2air [17] enabled simple flooding
attacks, wireless client impersonation and injections of different frames directly on a
wireless medium. In their well-known paper [3] authors showed how simple it is to
mount different DoS attacks on IEEE 802.11 networks. There were several research
activities coping with that problem and proposing cryptography based solution [6,13].
Furthermore, in 2005 the IEEE 802.11 Task Group w (TGw) was established with the
aim of creating a standard for authentication of management and control frames with
an expected draft due in 2008.
The ratification of IEEE 802.11i standard helped to gain more trust into providing
confidentiality, but due to still unprotected management frames, attacks on availability
of IEEE 802.11i were fast to follow [10,11].
In contrast to a previous research, in this work we have introduced a novel attack
based on performance decrease of a certain APs. This attack does not focuses on any
of vulnerabilities based on IEEE 802.11 itself but shows that low- and middle-priced
access points feature an operational anomaly that although intended to protect against
DoS attacks can be abused to implement a new attack. This, in contrary to a reputation
of WLAN as a low-cost technology shows that to provide a secure and reliable service
more attention should be made on a choice of a hardware.
On the other hand, the second attack introduced in this work has it’s roots within
a well ARP cache poisoning attack [16] but it is used in a novel way within a wire-
less network. Probably the most similar work describing ARP poisoning attack within
wireless networks is described in [7]. The author shows how a wireless network can be
used to attack the wired infrastructure of an enterprise. This attack does not concentrate
on the wireless network itself but uses it mainly to attack the wired network. Although
very interesting, the described attacks can be avoided by the mechanisms discussed in
the subsection 3.3.
5 Conclusion
In this work we have presented two different attacks within IEEE 802.11 wireless en-
vironments. First attack, based on extensive measurements of various APs abuses an
operational anomaly of low- and middle-priced APs to hijack wireless clients and inter-
cept their traffic. Although we cannot state that this attack can be applicable on every
AP, our measurements let us assume that cheaper devices do introduce certain perfor-
mance degradation which can also represent a security vulnerability.
While the first attack can be avoided by using more expensive equipement, in our
second attack we show simple and yet effective client-based attack. This attack is appi-
cable in every scenario which sacrifice link-layer security, but it is especially successful
within public hotspots where the users are new and do not know the infrastructure.
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